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Article 21

RE-THINKING THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 10: VACATING “MANIFEST DISREGARD”
By
Brian Forgue*
I.   INTRODUCTION
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) § 10 governs the process and grounds by which a
court can vacate an arbitral award.1 FAA § 10 outlines four interpretive provisions that
qualify as grounds to vacate an arbitrator’s award.2 The FAA provides that the fourth
ground for vacating an arbitral award is triggered when the arbitrators have “exceeded
their powers.”3 The ambiguity surrounding excess of authority has garnered attention
from many state and federal courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States.4, 5
The attention from the Supreme Court mainly arises from the common law rule granting
vacatur due to “manifest disregard” of the law, finding refuge under the ambiguous
umbrella of § 10(a)(4).
Manifest disregard is an amorphous, yet oft claimed ground for vacatur that has been
read into the FAA § 10 over the years in arbitration case law.6 A losing party to
arbitration can claim post-hoc that the award was rendered in manifest disregard of law,
thus invalidating the arbitrator’s award. Cases centered on manifest disregard have
wreaked havoc on lower court systems across many jurisdictions, thus warranting
attention from the Supreme Court for clarification.7 As evidenced by the decisions
discussed in this comment, however, the Supreme Court might not clarify as much about
manifest disregard as one would hope.
This comment will focus on the common law rule of manifest disregard of the law as
grounds for vacatur under FAA § 10(a), and how such a rule has been not only
established in case law, but also read into the FAA after decisions in three notable
Supreme Court cases that faced this issue.8 First, this comment will briefly discuss the
* Brian Forgue is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2016 Juris
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State Dickinson School of Law.
1

The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 [hereinafter “the FAA”]

2

Id.

3

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)

4

Hall Street Associates LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).

5

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).

6

See, e.g., Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5 th Cir. 2009).

7

Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396, at 1403 n.5 (2008) (deciding issue whether private contracting for expanded
judicial review is in manifest disregard of the law).
8

Hall Street Associates, 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008); Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
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history and the intent of the FAA. Second, it will examine the background of FAA § 9, §
10 and § 11, their application, and their particular collective effect in the statutory scheme
of the FAA. Third, this article will conduct an in depth analysis of the FAA’s excess of
authority provision. Fourth, particular focus will be given to how the Supreme Court dealt
with claims of manifest disregard as a ground for vacatur under § 10(a)(4) in Hall
Street, Stolt-Nielsen, and BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina.9 Finally, this
comment will critique the manifest disregard rule, and propose a rewritten § 10 that will
provide a clear, unambiguous framework as to which grounds will be sufficient, and the
proper interpretation of such grounds for vacating an arbitral award.
A.  

History of the FAA

Congress enacted the U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, also known as the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) on February 12, 1925.10 The FAA was drafted primarily
as a procedural statute meant to govern the disputes of merchants in very narrow and
highly specialized trades and practices.11 Today, however, arbitration as a practice has
evolved both internationally and domestically into the preferred method of adjudication
between private parties and governments alike, with the blessing of the United States
Supreme Court.12 A single arbitrator or an arbitrating panel, acts in a judge-like capacity
to resolve disputes between parties. Consistent with the original intent of the FAA,
arbitrators and arbitrating panels are typically experts in the industry in which the dispute
arises. Therefore, they are able to provide more subject matter expertise and familiarity
with the nuances that an industry-specific dispute embodies.13
B.  

Original Intent of the FAA and Arbitration Practice Today

Courts are typically deferential to the parties’ rights to freedom of contract
because “arbitration is a matter of consent not coercion,”14 and if parties have agreed to a
valid arbitration agreement, unless any improprieties under FAA § 10 are found to have

9

See BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014).

10

See generally Arnold M. Zack, The Federal Arbitration Act, Cornell University School of Industrial and
Labor
Relations,
available
at
https://www.ilr.cornell.edu/alliance/resources/Legal/federal_arbitration_act.html

11

Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 Tul. L. Rev.
1945, 1946 (1996).
12

Id. at 1.

13

Id. at 24

14

Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 109 S. Ct. 1248,
1256 (1989).
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occurred, courts will enforce the agreement and uphold the federal policy favoring
arbitration. 15
The Supreme Court stated in Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior University that, “The Act [FAA] was designed ‘to overrule the
judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate,’” and places such
agreements “‘upon the same footing as other contracts . . .’”16 The principle of contract
freedom allows parties in the arbitration context to tailor arbitration agreements however
they wish providing for where the arbitration takes place, the quantity and scope of the
arbitrator’s authority, how the award will be configured, and the admissibility of expert
witnesses in the arbitral proceedings.17 Enforcing and effectuating such private
agreements according to the terms of the contract is consistent with the intent of Congress
in creating the FAA.18
FAA § 10 embodies the ideals of contract freedom that permeate the American law
surrounding arbitration; where the arbitrator renders a decision outside the bargain of the
parties, a court may then—and only then—vacate the award. FAA § 10 is the crux to the
notion of finality of the arbitral process, and this section provides the grounds on which
arbitral awards can be vacated by a court.19 It is also important to briefly discuss the
functions and the language Congress used in drafting FAA § 9 and § 11, which highlights
the interplay of these two sections on the main focus of this comment, FAA § 10.
II.  BACKGROUND OF THE FAA §§ 9- 11
The functions of FAA §§ 9- 11 combine to define the three most pertinent stages and
potential pitfalls of an arbitral award. Section 9 summarizes the arbitrator’s award and
confirmation procedure; § 10 enumerates specific grounds for vacating an arbitral award;
and § 11 outlines the process by which courts can modify or correct an arbitral award.20
Collectively, the scheme of these three sections governs the recourse parties to arbitration
agreements can seek after an award has been rendered. In the following analysis of Hall
Street, Stolt-Nielsen, and BG Group, ancillary but important to the analysis of § 10, the
15

Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 927, 941 (1983)(stating questions
of arbitrability must be resolved with a “healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.”); see
also Arthur Andersen v. Carlisle et al., 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1902 (2009).
16

Volt, supra note 14, at 1253.

17

See generally Thomas E. Carbonneau, Commentary, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of
Arbitration Agreements, 36 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1189, 1204 (2003).

18

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1242 (1985) (stating that main Congressional
purpose in drafting the FAA was to enforce private agreements to arbitrate, not foster “expeditious
resolution of claims.”).
19

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4)

20

9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11
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Supreme Court analyzes and applies relevant portions of FAA § 9 and § 11 separately, as
well as §§ 9- 11 in conjunction with one another.
A.  

FAA § 9

FAA § 9 outlines the enforcement mechanism, the jurisdiction, and the overall
procedure of confirming an arbitral award.21 Unless grounds for vacatur or modification
are present, a court “must grant” a confirmation order that is properly brought.22 Section
9 provides for a one year period after the award is rendered for the winning party to
petition a court to confirm the award and begin the enforcement process.23 The one year
enforcement period has historically been the subject of dispute, with some jurisdictions
treating the enforcement period strictly, like a statute of limitations, and some
jurisdictions treating it as merely a guideline.24 Interestingly, some courts have taken the
view that the arbitration agreement itself denotes an implicit contract which binds the
parties to the arbitrator’s award.25 This means that if one party fails to adhere to the
arbitrator’s decision, that party has breached the very contract that bound the parties
when they originally agreed to arbitrate.26
In terms of enforcement, parties can contract at the front end of the agreement for
a court in a specific jurisdiction to handle the confirmation petition. The confirmation
process is not without teeth, and not simply for the sake of formality.27 The court’s
issuance of an official confirmation of an arbitral award is the first step in forcing
compliance on the losing party.28

21

9 U.S.C. § 9

22

9 U.S.C. § 9; see also 4 Commercial Arbitration § 137:1 (citing Reeves Bros. v. Capital—Mercury Shirt
Corp., 962 F. Supp. 408, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 62 (S.D. N.Y. 1997).
23

9 U.S.C. § 9

24

Kentucky River Mills v. Jackson, 206 F.2d 111, 120 (1953) (FAA § 9 one-year enforcement period,
providing for statutory enforcement of awards usually will not bar confirmation of a common law award
after the one-year period passes); see also Snyder v. Cress, 791 A.2d 1198, 1201 (2002) (conduct research
on time limitations in specific jurisdiction is prudent as some common-law arbitrations are governed by
state statute, not federal).
25

See generally 4 Thomas H. Oehmke & Joan M. Brovins, Commercial Arbitration § 138:4 Limitations
period (2014).
26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Id.
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B.

FAA § 11and the Doctrine of Separability.

FAA § 11 enables United State federal courts to modify and correct formalistic
errors contained in an arbitral award.29 The doctrine of separability is applied in the case
law through § 11.30 The separability doctrine requires enforcement of the arbitration
clause of a contract regardless of the validity of the underlying contract in which the
arbitration agreement exists.31 Requiring enforcement of an arbitration provision despite
validity issues with the underlying contract aligns with Congress’s intent for the FAA to
make agreements to arbitrate valid and enforceable in federal court.32 The doctrine
accomplishes this by separating the agreement to arbitrate and the remainder of the
contract to as two independent agreements, thus lessening the odds that an otherwise
valid agreement to arbitrate would be invalidated by a fatal flaw in the underlying
contract.33
An illustration of the doctrine of severability arose in Prima Paint v. F&C
Manufacturing.34 Consistent with the national federal policy favoring arbitration,35 the
Supreme Court employed the doctrine of separability and allowed the enforcement of an
arbitration clause in an otherwise invalid and fraudulent contract.36
Further, an arbitral award is not fatally flawed even if the arbitrator rules on a
matter not submitted to them, for the intent of § 11 is to “preserve due process without
unnecessary public intrusion into private arbitration procedures.”37

29

9 U.S.C. § 11.

30

Buckeye Check Cashing Inc., v. Cardegna, 126 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2006); see also Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 87 S. Ct. 1801, 1806 (1967).
31

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 87 S. Ct. 1801, 1806 (1967).

32

Margaret M. Harding, The Clash Between Federal and State Arbitration Law and the Appropriateness of
Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Process, 77 N EB . L. R EV . 397, 453 (1998).

33

Kristen Weisenberger, From Hostility to Harmony: Buckeye Marks a Milestone in the Acceptance of
Arbitration in American Jurisprudence, 16 A M . R EV . INT 'L A RB . 551, 557-58 (2005).
34

Prima Paint, 87 S. Ct. 1801.

35

Moses H. Cone, 103 S. Ct. 927.

36

Prima Paint, 87 S. Ct. 1801.

37

4 Thomas H. Oehmke & Joan M. Brovins, Commercial Arbitration § 132:5 Award on unsubmitted
matter (2014)(describing process when an award that is valid in part and invalid in part can be “severed” by
the court, if the severed portion does not impinge on the merits of the case).
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C.

FAA § 10

Section 10 governs the grounds for vacating an arbitral award. The language of
the statute explicitly states that the United States court “may” vacate an award if one or a
combination of grounds enumerated in § 10 are met.38 There are relatively few grounds
upon which a party can challenge an arbitral award, and they are largely procedural rather
than substantive, and parallel those grounds upon which parties generally claim defense in
contract law.39 The practice of review on the merits of a case after an award has been
rendered is inconsistent with the role of the courts when a party seeks vacatur.40 The
statutory provisions for vacatur are as follows:
(1)  Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2)  Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them.
(3)  Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4)  Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.41
Despite the construction of § 10 supporting a very limited basis for review, § 10
provides the recourse a party must seek if their particular circumstances warrant vacation
of an arbitral award. Importantly, however, these are the only enumerated grounds for
vacatur in § 10.42 A strict textual interpretation to § 10 does not allow common law rules
38

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4)

39

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (Where an award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means).

40

Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation, Construction and Application of § 10(a)(4) of Federal Arbitration Act
(9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(4)) Providing for Vacating of Arbitration Awards Where Arbitrators Exceed or
Imperfectly Execute Powers, 136 A.L.R. Fed. 183 (1997)(citing Tucker v. American Bldg. Maintenance,
451 F. Supp. 2d 591 (S.D. N.Y. 2006) (holding that a federal court cannot vacate an arbitral award in
arbitration under the FAA merely because it is convinced that the arbitration panel made the wrong call on
the law; on the contrary, the award should be enforced, despite a court's disagreement with it on the merits,
if there is a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached).
41

See generally 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(1)-(4)

42

Brad Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in Federal Court: Contemplating the
Use and Utility of the “Manifest Disregard” of the Law Standard, 27 Ind. L. Rev. 241 n.52 (1993) (stating
that no express ground for vacatur in § 10 exists for “mistake of fact or misinterpretation of the law by the
arbitrators.”).

260  

such as manifest disregard to warrant vacatur simply because the legislature did not
provide for such when drafting the FAA. Additionally, allowing broad, sweeping, merits
based review undermines the essential effectiveness and efficiency of the arbitral process,
when the intent of the FAA was to enforce private agreements to arbitrate.43 In Hall
Street and Stolt-Nielsen, however, the Supreme Court vastly broadened the applicable
grounds to vacate through manifest disregard and left the decisional law governing § 10
vacatur before BG Group on shaky, uncertain ground.
D.

What is Manifest Disregard?

“The inquiry as to whether the arbitrators exceeded their powers focuses on the
contractual authority of the arbitrator to decide an issue, not whether the issue was
correctly decided. Moreover, the burden of proving that the arbitrators exceeded their
authority is very great.”44 Another interpretation provides, “. . . we mean by ‘manifest
disregard of the law’ a situation ‘where it is clear from the record that the arbitrator
recognized the applicable law-and then ignored it.’”45
Manifest disregard is a judicially created, common law ground for vacatur, often
believed to have found its origins in dicta from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Wilko v.
Swan.46 Unfortunately, the interpretation from Wilko left many lower courts and legal
commentators unsure of how to define manifest disregard, and more specifically, how
and when to apply such a standard.47 It is prudent to note that the adjudicatory power the
arbitrator possesses derives from the contract of the parties only, and arbitrators should
never impute their own idea of justice beyond what the parties have contracted for.48 This

43

Dean Wittier Reynolds, 105 S. Ct. 1238.

44

See generally 4 Thomas H. Oehmke & Joan M. Brovins, Commercial Arbitration § 146:1 Generally
(2014) (outlining scope of permissible grounds for § 10 vacatur in commercial arbitration).
45

McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 463 F.3d 87 at 91-92 (Citing Advest Inc. v. McCarthy, 914
F.2d 6, 9 (1990)).
46

Wilko v. Swan, 74 S. Ct. 182, 187-88 (1953) (stating in dicta “the interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error
in interpretation.”).
47

14 A.L.R.6th 491 (Originally published in 2006) Adoption of Manifest Disregard of Law Standard as
Nonstatutory Ground to Review Arbitration Awards Governed by Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA)
Elizabeth D. Lauzon, J.D. (“The manifest disregard of the law standard for vacating an arbitration award is
an extremely narrow and judicially created rule with limited applicability. The standard to be applied is
whether the arbitrator understands and correctly states the law, and then boldly proceeds to disregard it in
fashioning the award.”).
48

Salem Hosp. v. Massachusetts Nurses Ass’n, 449 F.3d 234, 237 (1 st Cir. 2006).
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type of minimalism and deference to the parties’ contract is arguably mirrored in the very
structure of the FAA as a matter of Congressional intent.49
III.  THE TUMULTUOUS APPLICATION OF MANIFEST DISREGARD .
A.  

Hall Street Associates v. Mattel Inc.50

Hall Street Associates is an odd decision by the Supreme Court because it rules
against the emphatic national federal policy favoring arbitration,51 and simultaneously
undercuts the freedom of contract theory that pins the practice of arbitration together. The
operative portion of the arbitration agreement in Hall Street is as follows:
The US District Ct. for the District of Oregon may enter judgment upon
any award, either by confirming the award or by vacating, modifying or
correcting the award. The Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award:
i) where the arbitrator’s findings of facts are not supported by substantial
evidence, or ii) where the arbitrator’s conclusions of law are erroneous.52
The criteria in this agreement to vacate, modify, or correct an arbitral award
attempts to direct the Court to engage in two types of practices. First, it invites a merits
review of the arbitration after an arbitral award has been issued, which Congress intended
courts to do only in the most egregious cases,53 and further, some courts have reasoned
merits review should never happen despite painfully obvious legal or factual errors in the
award.54 The second practice revolves around choosing which level of review the court
should use at this stage of the arbitral process. The main issue in Hall Street was whether
private parties could privately contract for the type and scope of judicial review for
modification, vacatur, or confirmation of an arbitral award.55 The Supreme Court held

49

Julie E. Patalano, Note, Contracting for Judicial Review of Arbitration Agreements: Sidestepping the
FAA Weakens Arbitration Viability, 8 S UFFOLK J. T RIAL & A PP. A DVOC . 81, 94 (2003)(In developing the
FAA, Congress created a scheme where courts remained outside the arbitral review process and only
reviewed the merits of a case in the most extreme cases).
50

Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396.

51

Contra Moses H. Cone, 103 S. Ct. 927.

52

Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396, at 1400-01.

53

Patalano, supra note 49, at 85.

54

Advest, 914 F.2d 6, at 8 (1990) (“Even where such error is painfully clear, courts are not authorized to
reconsider the merits of arbitration awards.”).
55

See Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396.
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that the statutory grounds for confirming, vacating or modifying arbitral awards were
“exclusive” and could not be modified by the parties’ contract.56
The Ninth Circuit handled two cases which further illustrate the uncertainty
surrounding the power of contracting parties to dictate the scope of judicial review. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 1997 held in LaPine Tech. Corp.
v. Kyocera Corp. that federal courts had to honor the agreement made by parties who
contracted for a heightened level of judicial scrutiny at the end of the arbitral process.57
This case was later overruled by Kyocera v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc.58. The
Ninth Circuit, six years later, held that the FAA set forth the exclusive grounds for
federal courts to review arbitral awards, and “private parties have no power to alter or
expand those grounds” by means of private contract.59
Hall Street would subsequently adopt the Kyocera reasoning to hold that the
scope of judicial review for arbitration awards could not be modified by private
contract.60 A portion of the majority’s reasoning is arguably sound that by allowing de
novo review of arbitral awards, courts will inevitably review the merits of arbitrator
decisions, thus undermining several key elements as to the efficiency and finality of
arbitral awards.61 Additionally, implicit in their reasoning, the Supreme Court opines that
judicial powers of review, and the Courts’ jurisdiction, derives from legislative mandate
in the FAA.62 The Court’s holding that the FAA grounds are “exclusive” suggests that it
is inappropriate for the judiciary to receive powers of review from sources other than
Congress, especially the contract of private parties.63
Most germane to manifest disregard, the petitioner in Hall Street interprets a
portion of Wilko v. Swan to hold that an arbitrator’s interpretation of the law is open to
expanded judicial review as provided for by private contract of the parties.64 In attempts
to clarify Hall Street, however, the Supreme Court only furthers confusion surrounding
56

See Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396.

57

Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.,130 F.3d 884, (9 th Cir. 1997).

58

Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 994 (9 th Cir. 2003).

59

Id.

60

Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396; see also, Advest, 914 F.2d 6.

61

Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396, at 588 (“Instead of fighting the text, it makes more sense to see the three
provisions, §§ 9-11, as substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review
needed to maintain arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”).
62

Id. at 589 (“We do not know who, if anyone, is right, and so cannot say whether the exclusivity reading
of the statute is more of a threat to the popularity of arbitrators or to that of courts. But whatever the
consequences of our holding, the statutory text gives us no business to expand the statutory grounds.”).
63

See Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396.

64

See Wilko, 74 S. Ct. 182.
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this manifest disregard standard.65 The Court opines that the phrase “manifest disregard”
possibly refers to all of the grounds for vacatur under § 10, or that the phrase acts simply
as a colloquial shorthand encompassing situations where, for example, arbitrators are
“guilty of misconduct” pursuant to section § 10(a)(3) or when arbitrators “exceed their
powers” pursuant to § 10(a)(4).66
A large point of confusion lies in whether manifest disregard is applied as a catchall standard for any of the four provisions for vacatur in § 10, or whether “manifest
disregard” is applied as an additional, broad, exclusive standard which parties can now
claim to vacate an arbitral award.67 If manifest disregard is indeed the latter and now an
additional avenue to challenge awards, the finality of the arbitrator’s decision is
weakened and the virtues of the arbitral process diminish as the process further resembles
the traditional judicial form of adjudication. Also, if manifest disregard exists as a nonstatutory avenue for vacatur, courts are invited to second guess the arbitrator’s
understanding and interpretation of the relevant law. Without finality in the arbitrator’s
decision, arbitration simply becomes a “prologue to prolonged litigation.”68 Losing
parties claiming manifest disregard of the law will become the norm, inevitably inviting
the courts to conduct a merits review of an arbitration, thereby protracting the process.
Ultimately, this would only further diminish the autonomous nature of the arbitrator and
the arbitrator’s decision.
B.

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.69

Stolt-Nielsen involved a dispute between a shipping company and parcel tankers
engaged in shipping goods by sea.70 The dispute arose in a highly specialized industry,
involving very experienced merchants. After discovering Stolt-Nielsen’s illegal price
fixing practices, AnimalFeeds brought a putative class action suit.71 The contract between
these two parties, however, included an arbitration agreement that did not mention
recourse or liability in the context of class action suits.72

65

Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396.

66

Id.

67

See e.g. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396.

68

Remmey v. Painewebber Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4 th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1112, 115 S. Ct.
903, 130 L.Ed.2d 786 (1995).
69

Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758.

70

Id. at 1764

71

Id. at 1765.

72

Id. at 1764.
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The principle issue for the Supreme Court was whether imposing class arbitration
where an arbitration clause was silent on the issue was consistent with FAA §1.73 The
majority held that parties cannot submit to class arbitration without expressly agreeing to
do so.74 Silence in the contract was insufficient to prove the parties agreed to class
arbitration.75 With the Supreme Court’s decision, the language in § 10(a)(4) where the
arbitrator “exceeded their powers” was afforded a new definition. Before Stolt-Nielsen,
“exceeded their powers” typically referred to a situation when arbitrators ruled on a
matter that was not submitted to them in the parties’ contract. As long as the portion of
the award ruled on by the arbitrator that was not submitted did not implicate the merits of
the case, the doctrine of separability through § 11 allowed the court to strike that portion
of the award and enforce only what was relevant.76
Instead, the court found that an arbitrator exceeded her authority by ruling on
precisely the issue submitted by the parties.77 Justice Ginsburg notes in her dissent that
the majority somehow reclassifies the panel’s ruling as a decision in manifest disregard
of the law, and decides in accordance with their own interpretation of the governing law.78
Essentially, “exceeded their authority” now means that when a reviewing court disagrees
with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the law as applied to the facts of a given case,
the award was rendered in manifest disregard of the law, and can be vacated under §
10(a)(4); this method of review epitomizes the merits review of an award.
Infamously, the Supreme Court left the status of manifest disregard unclear. The
majority stated:
We do not decide whether “manifest disregard” survives our decision in
Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, as an independent ground for review or as
a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth in 9 U.S.C.
§ 10. AnimalFeeds characterizes that standard as requiring a showing that
the arbitrators “knew of the relevant [legal] principle, appreciated that this
principle controlled the outcome of the disputed issue, and nonetheless
willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it.79

73

9 U.S.C. § 1.

74

Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758, at 1775.

75

Id.

76

Buckeye, 126 S. Ct. 1204; see also Prima Paint, 87 S. Ct. 1801.

77

Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758 at 1780. (Ginsburg, J dissenting) (explaining the panel performed its
function, ruling only on permissibility of class arbitration. Further stating the issue was not ripe for review
and the majority merely substituted their own judgment for that of experienced, leading arbitrators).
78

Id. at 1777.

79

Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758, at 1768 n.3 (2010).
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Despite the fact that this case stands together with Hall Street as an anomalous
decision which cuts against the national federal policy supporting arbitration,80 Justice
Alito and the majority expressly state they are punting the ambiguity created by Hall
Street that surrounds the meaning and application of manifest disregard.81 Though the
majority stated they did not decide the meaning of manifest disregard, their holding
suggested that when a court disagrees with the arbitrator’s interpretation and subsequent
application of the law in a given case, this can and will be considered manifest disregard
subject to vacatur under § 10.

C.

BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina.82

BG Group unequivocally restores the autonomy and power that might have been
stripped from arbitrators by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hall Street and StoltNielsen. This decision not only fully restores arbitrator authority, but it also takes
arbitrator authority to a whole new level previously unseen in the modern day practice of
arbitration. The result rightfully leaves casual observers of arbitration baffled.
BG Group not only involved a dispute between two private parties, but a dispute
that escalated to the point where the issue between these two entities was properly
governed by a portion of an international treaty.83 A portion of the dispute resolution
provision in the Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) between the United Kingdom and
Argentina was at issue in this case.84 The provision stated that either party can submit a
dispute between one of the nations and an investor of another to a competent tribunal in
the country where the investment was made—more simply, a local court85 (hereinafter
“local litigation requirement”). Further, the agreement provides for arbitration:
(i) where after a period of eighteen months has elapsed from the moment
when the dispute was submitted to the competent tribunal, the said tribunal
has not given its final decision; or (ii) where the final decision of the
aforementioned tribunal has been made but the parties are still in dispute.86
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The first prong of the provision required BG Group to seek relief in local
Argentinian courts and only when after 18 months, and only when the tribunal has not
rendered their decision, then BG Group can submit their dispute to arbitration.87 Given
the economic crisis that struck Argentina in 2011/2012 and the resulting fallout, however,
BG Group thought it unlikely that they would see a profitable return on their investment
in MetroGAS, and prematurely submitted their dispute to arbitration without complying
with the treaty’s 180 day local litigation requirement.88 The issue was submitted to an
arbitral tribunal in Washington, D.C. 89
The primary issue in this case is who decides, the court or the arbitrator, the
governing interpretation and application of the local litigation requirement? The majority
concluded that such a procedural, gatekeeping question is for the arbitrator to decide and
for courts to review with “considerable deference” to the arbitrator’s ruling.90 The
majority held that treaties are simply contracts between nations,91 and that the local
litigation requirement was merely a “procedural condition precedent to arbitration.”92
Most relevant to this comment and manifest disregard, at the District Court level,
Argentina sought to vacate the award rendered for lack of arbitrator jurisdiction citing §
10(a)(4) for arbitrators who have “exceeded their powers.”93 Argentina asked the district
court to add subject matter inarbitrability to the list of definitions sufficient for vacatur
under §10(a)(4).
The holding from BG Group creates several additional questions for manifest
disregard. Would Argentina have had a stronger claim citing “manifest disregard” rather
than subject matter inarbitrability? Does manifest disregard already impliedly include
subject matter inarbitrability?
A token of solace to be taken from this case might be that given the extreme
deference granted to arbitrators by the Supreme Court, the arbitrator’s almost unfettered
authority might now preclude a higher court, including the Supreme Court, from applying
review for vacatur consistent with Hall Street and Stolt-Nielsen. Perhaps the Court’s
deference will now apply to an arbitrator’s interpretation and application of governing
law. It is unlikely to have mattered how Argentina framed their claim for vacatur, but the
answers to these questions are no more clear than they were prior to the decisions in Hall
Street, Stolt-Nielsen, and BG Group. This leads me to my critique and proposed fix to the
manifest disregard standard.
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IV.  CRITIQUE OF MANIFEST DISREGARD
The common law rule of manifest disregard has successfully eluded a uniform
definition and application. Lower courts wrangled with its ambiguity for years, and when
the Supreme Court stepped in to provide a workable definition, they squandered the
opportunity both in Hall Street and Stolt-Nielsen. Reports show that the intent of
Congress in creating recourse to vacatur in § 10 of the FAA was to have such
nullification of arbitral awards apply in only the most egregious cases.94 Manifest
disregard has been warped beyond recognition through common law interpretation,
assuming it had a recognizable definition at the outset. Having manifest disregard apply
as the Supreme Court opines in Hall Street has a deleterious effect on the practice of
arbitration. As a result, the losing party to arbitration can now claim manifest disregard
and the Supreme Court is unsure of how to apply the standard, yet treats it as an
enumerated ground for vacatur under § 10. The opinion in Stolt-Nielsen continues to
convolute the definition by stating that the Supreme Court did not actually define
manifest disregard, yet applied it in their decision to mean that whenever the Supreme
Court disagrees with the interpretation of the law by the arbitrator, the award is rendered
in manifest disregard and is therefore, subject to § 10 vacatur.
In a system where common law decisions interpret and define statutory
provisions, what results when the highest court fails to understandably and uniformly
define a standard that has such an impact on the practical benefits of arbitration? Below is
a proposed solution.
V.  PROPOSED SOLUTION

FOR

§ 10 VACATUR

When a rule becomes mangled beyond recognition, the slate must be wiped clean.
Section 10 vacatur is an available challenge to an award in the narrowest of
circumstances of arbitration proceedings. By its very nature, arbitration is designed to be
more expedient and efficient than the traditional court system.95 With that said, parties
forfeit the full protections of the courts when they choose voluntarily to engage in
arbitration, including the right to an appeal. After all, arbitration is a product of
contract.96 If a party wants all the protections of a court of law, simply put, that party
should not consent to arbitration. Therefore, the only grounds for vacatur of an arbitral
award for a party fully knowing the extremely limited nature of review, will be those
grounds expressly enumerated in the FAA. Common law rules and interpretations have
shaped vacatur into an unrecognizable determination, and such interpretations created an
unsustainable application of vacatur.
Solving the ambiguity surrounding manifest disregard and § 10 vacatur should be
left to Congress. Congress has the resources and investigative power to determine
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whether manifest disregard is worth preserving.97 Preservation of this standard, however,
will likely only lead to more confusion. The legislature wrote the FAA with enumerated
grounds for vacatur, intending them to be narrow.98 Courts have interpreted the
provisions, albeit incorrectly, and have created their own rules over years of adjudication.
At present, the common law rule has become so muddled and at odds with Congressional
intent that it has come full circle and Congress is the proper body to wipe the slate clean
and start anew.
There must be rights protection written into the statute of § 10, but these
protections must be supremely limited in scope, and only exist to ensure a fair, expedient
arbitration process. Only the most egregious cases of arbitrator misconduct will invalidate
an award. Therefore, a possible solution would be to completely do away with the
manifest disregard as a valid ground for vacatur under § 10. When parties choose to
arbitrate, they enter a contract for the swift and final decision of an arbitrator. Forfeiture
of expediency and specialized adjudication is the concession for traditional court
protection of rights, the availability of appeal, and a possible reversal of a judicial
decision. A potential rewrite of FAA § 10 is as follows:
Section 10. Same; Vacation; Grounds; Rehearing
(a)  In any of the following cases the United States Court in and for the
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration99
(1)  Where the award was procured by illegal acts, corruption, bribery,
collusion, fraud, duress, or undue means by either, both, or all arbitrating
parties;
(2)  Where arbitrator engages in misconduct including, but not limited to,
accepting bribes, collusion, prejudicing rights of either party, refusal to
hear evidence or testimony relevant to the dispute, failure to disclose past,
present, or future business or personal relationships with arbitrating
parties. Materiality and significance of disclosed relationships by the
arbitrator shall be for the arbitrating parties to determine during arbitrator
selection;
(3)  In the case of a tribunal or panel wherein parties each designate one
arbitrator and those designees appoint a third, neutral arbitrator, the duties
imposed by sections (1) & (2) shall apply to all arbitrators, but with extra
emphasis on the neutral arbitrator;
(4)  Definitions:
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a.   “Failure to disclose” means that an arbitrator must disclose even
the most tangential of relationships with any arbitrating party
appearing before them. Failure to disclose will result in a per se
presumption of arbitrator partiality, regardless of the significance
of disclosure, materiality of the disclosure to the proceedings, or
length of time after the award the undisclosed information is
discovered, and will vacate the award. The cost of arbitrating the
issue again with an impartial arbitrator shall shift to the party with
whom the previous arbitrator had an undisclosed relationship.
b.   “Prejudicing rights” refers to the procedure of how the arbitral
proceeding is conducted. Though the arbitrator possesses much
influence over the proceedings, the arbitrator shall not hinder a
party’s procedural right to a fair and expedient adjudication
consistent with section (2). This definition does not allow
substantive review of factual assertions in the record.
(5) The provisions enumerated in this section, and these provisions alone,
shall provide the only recourse to vacating an award. Any attempt of a
court of law to circumvent the provisions enumerated in this section vis-àvis, common law rules justifying vacatur will not be recognized, nor
enforced. Any perceived ambiguity shall be interpreted narrowly and
strictly construed to the provisions in this section.
VI. CONCLUSION
Vacatur is a necessary evil to the finality of arbitration. Vacatur provides recourse for
aggrieved parties in only the most narrow circumstances and guards against egregious
arbitrator misconduct. The Supreme Court has led arbitration jurisprudence down several
different paths in recent years with the abovementioned decisions. Arbitration as a
practice is currently in a very expansive and permissive place due to its efficiency and
practicality. Without such a remedy as vacatur, the practice of arbitration is incomplete.
Thus, Congress should revise § 10 and overrule the existing precedent regarding manifest
disregard.

270  

